

SNIE 82/83-82: Short-Term Prospects for Central America,  
8 June 1982

Excerpts from: **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

- It should be emphasized, however, that the magnitude and complexity of domestic vulnerabilities and Communist-supported subversion in Central America will remain so great that the recent positive developments will almost certainly not be sustained in the absence of continuing strong external support.
- Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Salvadoran guerrillas—as well as [ ] certain leftist political groups in Latin America and Europe—will continue to float negotiation schemes from time to time. As before, from the viewpoint of Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Salvadoran guerrillas, these will be largely for tactical political use.

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Excerpts from: **KEY JUDGMENTS**

- For tactical reasons, Cuba and the extreme left may step up attempts to explore “political solutions” in order to reduce the level of counterinsurgency efforts by El Salvador, while they use the next months to regroup, rearm, and mold additional unity among the guerrillas.
- Cuba, Nicaragua, and their allies will also continue to augment their subversive efforts with initiatives for “negotiations and peace.” These will be designed to attract non-Communist support for the extreme left, reduce foreign support for the target governments, divide the target governments, and complicate relations between the United States and its allies. We consider it highly unlikely that Cuba and Nicaragua will negotiate in good faith during the period of this Estimate.

Excerpts from: **The International Arena and the Diplomatic Front**

42. Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Salvadoran guerrillas also use negotiations:

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— To attract and hold non-Communist support for the extreme left, such as that from [ ] many social democratic parties; this support helps to confuse observers about the real nature of the guerrilla movements; it acts to attract needed financial resources, and it offers political leverage against the continuation of foreign aid</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>to the target governments.</li> <li>— To reduce foreign support for the target governments by creating the impression of near-total international isolation and therefore hopelessness.</li> <li>— To create or aggravate divisions within the governing coalitions in each target country and sow distrust between those governments and the United States.</li> </ul> |
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